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Abstract
This paper considers an e-commerce market wherein a vertically integrated market-
place competes downstream with a single retailer and upstream with an independent
parcel delivery operator. Because of the information collected by the marketplace on
customershabits and preferences, the integrated parcel delivery operator has lower de-
livery costs than its competitor. Products are di¤erentiated according to the retailer and
the parcel operator who delivers them. The representation of product di¤erentiation is
inspired by the Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (2002) discrete choice model.
We study several scenarios each representing a specic policy implemented to regu-
late the marketplace. The rst one is a data sharing policy. The integrated marketplace
has to share its information with the other delivery operator which in turn will lower
this operators cost of delivering the marketplaces product. The second one is verti-
cal separation under which the parcel delivery operator previously owned and managed
by the marketplace becomes independent. Finally we consider a full dismantlement
scenario under which there is both vertical and horizontal separation.
We show that the optimal policy is either complete dismantlement or data shar-
ing. The relative impacts on consumer surplus and total welfare of these two options
involve a tradeo¤ between the increased competition implied by complete dismantling
and the data related delivery cost advantage achieved under data sharing. When this
cost advantage is small, completely dismantling dominates, while data sharing is the
best policy when the cost advantage is large.
Keywords: E-commerce, delivery operators, vertical integration, platform regulation,
data sharing, dismantling
JEL Codes: L42, L81, L87.
1 Introduction
The economic and societal role of digital platforms has been a hotly debated topic.
They are under close scrutiny by European competition authorities for a while and
their US counterparts have now followed suit. The subject is also receiving increasing
attention in the media and in political circles. Each platform raises specic questions
but the general themes are market power, the collection and (mis)use of personal data
and related privacy issues, free speech and for some even their possible interference
in the political process. Consequently the call for regulatory or competition policy
intervention has become ever more pressing. Various reforms are considered including
extreme solutions such a dismantlement of the platform.
The e-commerce sector, which has seen the increasing concentration of market power,
is no exception. It has witnessed the emergence of marketplaces (a sort of horizontal
integration of various independent retailers allowing the marketplace to o¤er a long
tail of products) and a trend to vertical integration. In particular, the data collected
by major platforms on their users (on the platformsboth side) provide them with a
competitive edge over their competitors on all the markets they are involved in (retail but
other parcel delivery in our case). On the demand side, it allows them to customize their
search engines to customer proles and use sophisticated pricing strategies. But it is
also signicant on the cost side as superior information allows an integrated marketplace
to optimize its logistics and delivery network. This comes on top of traditional market
power issues raised by horizontal and vertical integration.
In this paper we focus on the cost advantage associated with data collection. We
study the equilibrium that emerges when a vertically integrated marketplace competes
downstream with a single retailer and upstream with an independent parcel delivery
operator. Because of the information collected by the marketplace, the integrated par-
cel delivery operator has lower delivery costs than its competitor. Products are dif-
ferentiated according to the retailer and the parcel operator who delivers them. The
representation of product di¤erentiation is inspired by the Anderson, De Palma and
Thisse (2002) discrete choice model and its application to the e-commerce sector follows
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We study several scenarios each representing a specic policy implemented to regu-
late the marketplace. The rst one is a data sharing policy. The integrated marketplace
has to share its information with the other delivery operator which in turn will lower
this operators cost of delivering the marketplaces products. The second one is vertical
separation under which the operator previously owned and managed by the marketplace
becomes independent. Finally we consider a full dismantlement scenario under which
there is both vertical and horizontal separation. The retailers which were previously
a¢ liated with the marketplace now become independent.
The main conclusion we obtain is that the optimal policy is either complete disman-
tlement or data sharing. The relative impacts on consumer surplus and total welfare
of these two options involve a tradeo¤ between the increased competition implied by
complete dismantling and the data related delivery cost advantage achieved under data
sharing. When this cost advantage is small, completely dismantling dominates, while
data sharing is the best policy when the cost advantage is large. Vertical separation
is never optimal. While it may or may not yield a larger welfare than the reference
scenario it is always dominated by the two other policies.
2 The model
We consider an e-commerce sector with three retailers indexed j = A,M and B, and two
delivery operators i = 1; 2. Initially, retailer A sells it ownproducts but is also active
as a marketplace which represents the exclusive outlet of retailer M . This assumption
is the simplest way to represent the superior market power of the marketplace. Most
signicantly, it implies that when the marketplace is fully dismantled the total number
of variants does not change.1 Products are di¤erentiated according to the retailer and
the mode of delivery. Consequently there are initially six variants of the product (of
which a total of four is sold by the marketplace).
Product di¤erentiation is represented by the Anderson-De Palma-Thisse (1992) dis-
1Otherwise there would be a bias in the comparison across scenarios in favor of complete dismantle-
ment.
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crete choice model. A di¤erentiated product is sold by downstream sellers A=M and
B with marginal cost of kj . It is shipped via di¤erentiated upstream parcel delivery
operators 1 and 2 (indexed by i) with marginal costs of cij . In the initial scenario op-
erator 1 is owned and managed by A=M . Vertical integration gives the parcel delivery
operator integrated with the marketplace superior information which is reected by a
lower marginal cost incurred to deliver products sold on the marketplace, than the cost
incurred by the independent parcel delivery operator 2 to deliver the same products.
Furthermore we assume that delivery operator 2 incurs the same marginal cost to de-
liver the products sold on the marketplace than the product sold by the independent
retailer B. Consequently, we have c1A=M = 1 < c2A=M = c2B = 2. For simplicity
we assume c1B = c2B = 2: when it delivers for retailer B, delivery operator 1 does
not benet from superior information. Consequently, there are two relevant levels of
marginal costs. A low level, 1, which applies when the integrated operator delivers the
marketplaces parcels, and a higher level, 2, which applies to all other delivery ows.
There is a mass 1 of consumers. Consumer l derives utility
U lij = b  pij + "lij
from consuming good ij where j = A=M;B and i = 1; 2. The random variables "lij are
identically and independently distributed across consumers and products with double
exponential distribution over R with scale parameter .2 We assume that the market-
place sells two variants (at the same price). Its demand is thus the sum of demands
addressed to two retailers A and M. In the initial scenario there are thus six variants
of the product, four of which are sold by the marketplace). However, consumers also
have the option not to participate in the market. To model this we introduce an outside
option as a seventh variant, indexed 00 with a given price p00.
The parameter  reects the degree of product di¤erentiation. When  is small, the
di¤erent variants are close substitutes and competition is intense.3 When  is large,
each variant has roughly speaking a local monopoly and competition is not very intense.















, a smaller  means that there is
a larger probability of x exceeding a given threshold. This can be interpreted as the products supplied
being closer substitutes.
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Consumers buy their preferred variant of the product if any. Consequently consumer
l buys product ij when
U lij  max
mn6=ij
fUmng



































p1A=M ; p1B; p2A=M ; p2B

is the vector of consumer prices.
To understand (1) note that the marketplace sells two products: its own and that
of the a¢ liated seller. We assume that these are sold at the same price. The price may
vary according to the mode of delivery, though. One can thus think about the four
variants as consisting of two pairs (one for each delivery operator) with the products in
a given pair sold at the same price.4
The impact of prices on demand levels are given in Appendix A.1. The expressions
show that a variants market share is not surprisingly a decreasing function of its price.
Furthermore, demand for any good increases if the price of one of the other variants
increases. In other words, the variants are substitutes. The expressions also illustrate
the role of the parameter . In particular the cross price e¤ect is the larger the smaller
is  which is in line with our discussion above.
We consider four main scenarios. The reference case has already been sketched. The
other scenarios study the implication of specic regulatory measures which are e¤ectively
discussed in practice. The rst of these requires the integrated marketplace/delivery
operator to share its data with the other actors. The second one consists in vertical
separatism. Finally, the third one considers a more drastic reform where the integrated
rm is dismantled both horizontally and vertically.
4Even if they would be allowed to di¤er, these price would be equal in equilibrium by symmetry.
Consequently our assumption is not neccessary, but it is convenient for it simplies notation.
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3 The scenarios
We shall now present the di¤erent scenarios. For each of them we dene the underlying
game and specically its timing. In all scenarios the game is sequential where delivery
rates are set rst followed by consumer prices. However, vertical separation or total
dismantlement a¤ect the number of players and the strategy space.
We start with the reference scenario, R, which is essentially the game already pre-
sented in the previous section. We then consider Scenario S, with data sharing. The
structure of the game under data sharing is the same as under the reference scenario but
the cost of the independent operator for delivering the marketplaces products is reduced
(possibly to the same level as for the integrated operator). Scenario VS represents a
more drastic departure: there are now two independent delivery operators which has a
signicant impact on the playerspayo¤s in Stage 1 and adds a new strategic variable,
namely t1A=M , the delivery rate set by delivery operator 1 to deliver the marketplaces
product. Intuitively one can expect that vertical separation reduces market power but
comes at the expense of introducing extra double marginalization. In other words, the
traditional e¤ects of vertical (dis)integration can be expected to be relevant.
3.1 Reference scenario: R
We consider a sequential game where delivery rates are set rst followed by prices.
We determine a subgame perfect equilibrium which means that in Stage 1, delivery
operators anticipate the price equilibrium induced in Stage 2. We impose no a priori
vertical restraints such as bundling and foreclosure, but these may appear endogenously
in equilibrium when the relevant transaction (demand for the variant) is zero.
Let tR=
 
t1B; t2A=M ; t2B

denote the vector of the delivery rates relevant in this







 bpR+  p2A=M   t2A=MD2A=M  bpR
+ (t1B   c1B)D1B
 bpR ; (3)
5
while delivery operator 2 chooses t2B and t2A=M to maximize
R2 = (t2B   c2B)D2B(bpR) +  t2A=M   c2A=MD2A=M (bpR): (4)
Recall that c1A=M = 1 < c2A=M = c2B = c1B = 2 so that there are two relevant levels
of marginal costs. A low level, 1, which applies when the integrated operator delivers
the marketplaces parcels, and a higher level, 2, which applies to all other delivery
ows. Observe that at this stage prices are determined by the induced second stage
equilibrium. Consequently, bpR is a function of tR=  t1B; t2A=M ; t2B. In Stage 2, the























which is the same expression as (3), except that delivery rates are now given. Consumer










3.2 Data sharing: S
The marketplace is now required to share its data with the delivery operator 2. Conse-
quently the cost for this operator of delivering variant 2A=M is now given by e2, with
c2B > e2  c1A=M . The timing of the game is the same as in scenario R, but the prot
function of operator 2 changes.






 bpS+  p2A=M   t2A=MD2A=M  bpS
+ (t1B   c1B)D1B
 bpS ; (6)
while delivery operator 2 chooses t2B and t2A=M to maximize
S2 = (t2B   c2B)D2B(bpS) +  t2A=M   e2D2A=M (bpS): (7)
At this stage prices are determined by the induced second stage equilibrium. Conse-
quently, bpS is a function of tS=  t1B; t2A=M ; t2B.
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which is the same expression as (6), except that delivery rates are now given. Retailer









Note that since the second stage is the same in scenariosR and S, we have bpR  t1B; t2A=M ; t2B =bpS  t1B; t2A=M ; t2B. However, the rst stage objectives for operator 2, (6) and (7) di¤er.
Consequently the solutions will di¤er unless D2A=M = 0 in both scenarios.
3.3 Vertical separation: VS
This scenario is similar, except for the asymmetry it involves, to the reference scenario
considered by Borsenberger et al. (2020). It di¤ers from scenario R in two ways.
First, there is no longer vertical integration between A=M and operator 1. Second, the
separation removes the cost advantage of operator 1 when delivering product variant
1A=M .
The timing of the game is as follows. In a rst stage delivery operators i = 1; 2
simultaneously set rates prices tiA=M and tiB for retailers A=M and B respectively.








 bpV S , i = 1; 2: (9)
Note that the vector of delivery rates now has four arguments tV S=
 
t1A=M ; t1B; t2A=M ; t2B

.
In stage 2, retailers j = A=M;B simultaneously set their prices p1j and p2j by taking








, j = 1; 2: (10)
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3.4 Complete dismantling: CD
Now the activities of retailers A and M (previously grouped into the marketplace)
are separated. As the result there are now three independent retailers A;M and B.
This does not a¤ect the total number of variants but both the consumer price vector
and the delivery rate vector now have six dimensions: tV S=(t1A; t1M ; t1B; t2A; t2M ; t2B)
and pV S=(p1A; p1M ; p1B; p2A; p2M ; p2B). This is because retailers A and M can charge
di¤erent prices and may have to pay di¤erent delivery charges.
In a rst stage delivery operators i = 1; 2 simultaneously set rates tiA; tiM and tiB








 bpCD , i = 1; 2: (11)
Compared to expression (9) the sum now has an extra term. Furthermore the induced
second stage prices bpV S have di¤erent expressions.
In stage 2, retailers j = A;M;B simultaneously set their prices p1j and p2j by taking








, j = 1; 2: (12)
4 Numerical Results
When a scenario implies symmetric retailers and operators, the model can be solved
analytically but even then the expressions are not very telling; see Anderson et al.
(1992). Among the scenarios dened in the previous section the only symmetric one
is CD. All others involve some asymmetry and in these cases, obtaining analytical
closed form solutions would be at best very tedious. However, the model has only few
parameters so that numerical solutions are very informative. Note that the constant b
has no impact on the results and can be xed arbitrarily.5 We set b = 15 in all our
scenarios. Furthermore the absolute levels of costs are not relevant; one of the cost
5Setting b su¢ ciently large ensures that utilities are positive. However when the outside option is
introduced via an extra variant with a given price rather than a constant utility level, this is of no
relevance.
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levels can be normalized at one without loss of generality. Consequently we set 2 = 1.
This leaves us with four relevant parameters, namely , 1, ~2 and p00. Recall that 
reects the degree of product di¤erentiation; when it is small, the di¤erent variants are
close substitutes and competition is intense. With 2 normalized at one, the parameter
1 measures cost of the integrated delivery operator as a proportion of that of the
independent delivery operator. The lower is 1 the larger is the cost advantage implied
by the data available to the integrated delivery operator. Similarly ~2 measures the
independent delivery operators cost of delivering a variant sold by the marketplace
under data sharing and relative to its original cost (absent of data sharing). Finally p00
is the price of the outside option relative to the cost of an independent delivery operator
(which we have normalized at 1).
In our setting, it turns out that the crucial parameter is 1 and thus the cost advan-
tage that data provides to the integrated delivery operator. Depending on the level of 1
two patterns of results emerge in particular concerning the most appropriate regulatory
policy. We show this by considering two baseline scenarios: one with a relatively large
level of 1 (small cost advantage) and one with a smaller level of 1 (large cost advan-
tage). These scenarios reveal our main results and illustrate the underlying intuition.
They are followed by a number of variants with di¤erent levels of the crucial parameters
which show that the results are robust.
4.1 Baseline scenarios
In both of these scenarios we set  = 1 and p00 = 6 = 62. As will become clear from
the results these values ensure that competition intensity is rather large (relatively low
) and the outside option su¢ ciently expensive (making it less attractive) so that a
large share of the market is covered. In both cases in the reference scenario more than
95% of consumers buy one of the 6 variants.
4.1.1 Small cost advantage: 1 = 0:9
Recall that the independent delivery operators cost is normalized at 2 = 1. We
consider two possible scenarios under data sharing. In scenario S1 we have ~2 = 0:9
9
so that the independent delivery operators cost when delivering a product sold by the
marketplace become equal to that of the integrated delivery operator. In scenario S2 it
remains larger with ~2 = 0:95.
The equilibria obtained in the di¤erent scenarios are presented in Table 1.6 The re-
sults show that data sharing under the two considered assumptions regarding its impact
on cost (S1 and S2) has no signicant impact on consumer surplus but increases total
welfare.7 Not surprisingly those e¤ects are more signicant when data sharing results
in full cost matching than when the cost of the independent delivery operator remains
larger than that of the integrated delivery operator. The independent delivery operator
benets while the prot of the independent retailer decreases. Vertical separation de-
creases consumer surplus because double marginalization leads to a price increase of the
marketplaces variants. This also allows retailer B to increase its prices and to realize
a larger prot. Total surplus, on the other hand, increases compared to the previous
scenarios. The examples below, however, demonstrate that this is not a robust result as
total surplus under vertical separation may even be lower than in the reference scenario.
Finally, complete dismantling dominates all other scenarios both from the perspec-
tive of consumers and that of total welfare. The fact that this policy performs better
than VS does not come as a surprise because costs are not a¤ected while competition
becomes more intense. One can expect that this is a robust result and this is conrmed
in all the examples presented below. The comparison with S on the other hand is less
trivial. Increased competition now comes at the expense of and increase in delivery
costs because delivery operators no longer benet from the data advantage (directly or
via data sharing). In this scenario the cost advantage is rather small which explains
that the competition e¤ect dominates. These conicting e¤ects are conrmed by the
following scenario.
6A  in a cell means that the variable is not relevant in that scenario.
7Consumer surplus increases slightly but this is not apparent in the table where only two digits are
displayed for the sake of readability.
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Scenario R S1 S2 V S CD
p1A=M 3:78 3:78 3:78 5:05 4:41
p2A=M 4:40 4:35 4:37 5:05 4:41
p1B 5:37 5:37 5:37 4:61 4:41
p2B 4:20 4:21 4:21 4:61 4:41
p1M     4:41
p2M     4:41
t1A    2:91 2:94
t2A=M 3:24 3:19 3:22 2:91 2:94
t1B 4:10 4:10 4:10 2:90 2:94
t2B 2:93 2:95 2:94 2:90 2:94
t1M     2:94
t2M     2:94
1A=M 1:88 1:88 1:88 0:90 0:93
2 0:91 0:94 0:92 0:90 0:93
A    1:14 0:47
B 0:27 0:26 0:26 0:71 0:47
M     0:47
d1A=M 0:49 0:48 0:49 0:26 0:16
d2A=M 0:26 0:27 0:27 0:26 0:16
d1B 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:20 0:16
d2B 0:16 0:15 0:16 0:20 0:16
d1M     0:16
d2M     0:16
CS 12:17 12:17 12:17 11:64 12:41
TS 15:24 15:27 15:25 15:31 15:71
Table 1: Baseline scenario with small cost advantage.
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Scenario R S1 S2 V S CD
p1A=M 3:33 3:29 3:31 5:05 4:41
p2A=M 3:97 3:75 3:86 5:05 4:41
p1B 5:40 5:38 5:39 4:61 4:41
p2B 4:04 4:15 4:09 4:61 4:41
p1M     4:41
p2M     4:41
t1A    2:91 2:93
t2A=M 3:24 2:98 3:10 2:91 2:93
t1B 4:20 4:22 4:21 2:90 2:93
t2B 2:85 2:98 2:91 2:90 2:93
t1M     2:93
t2M     2:93
1A=M 1:83 1:79 1:81 0:90 0:93
2 0:87 1:02 0:94 0:90 0:93
A    1:14 0:47
B 0:19 0:16 0:18 0:70 0:47
M     0:47
d1A=M 0:53 0:51 0:52 0:26 0:16
d2A=M 0:28 0:32 0:30 0:26 0:16
d1B 0:03 0:03 0:03 0:20 0:16
d2B 0:13 0:10 0:12 0:20 0:16
d1M     0:16
d2M     0:16
CS 12:92 12:96 12:94 11:64 12:41
TS 15:83 15:95 15:88 15:31 15:71
Table 2: Baseline scenario with large cost advantage.
4.1.2 Large cost advantage: 1 = 0:5
We now consider the case where the data related delivery cost advantage is more sig-
nicant by assuming that 1 = 0:5. Once again two possible scenarios for data sharing
are considered. In S1 we have ~2 = 0:5 so that the cost advantage is fully matched by
the independent delivery operator. In S2 we have ~2 = 0:75 so that its cost decreases
but remains larger than that of the integrated delivery operator. The results are shown
in Table 2.
One notices that data sharing now has a more signicant (though still small) impact
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on consumer surplus. However, the main interest of this example lies in the comparison
between S and CD. The cost delivery cost advantage implied by the data (whether di-
rect or shared) is now so signicant that it outweighs the increased competition intensity
brought about by total dismantling. In this case data sharing is the best policy.
4.2 Robustness checks
We now present a number of examples with other values of the relevant parameters.
They show that while some of the observed e¤ects on prices, delivery rates or prots
are specic to the considered examples, the main conclusions appear to be robust.
To be precise vertical separation is never the optimal policy. A regulating authority
concerned with either consumer or total welfare should implement either data sharing
or full dismantling. Which of these policies is determined by a tradeo¤ between delivery
costs and competition intensity.
4.2.1 Larger scale factor implying lower competition intensity
Table 3 and 4 illustrate the two relevant cases when  = 1:5. The other parameters are
the same as before and so are the two scenarios regarding the data related delivery cost
advantage.
Specically, in Table 3 we have 1 = 0:9 and with two data sharing scenarios obtained
for ~2 = 0:9 in scenario S1 and ~2 = 0:95 in scenario S2. This is the case where
the cost advantage is small so that the competition e¤ect dominates and implies the
complete dismantling is the best policy. This shows that the main conclusion obtained
from Table 1 remains valid even when competition intensity is smaller - a fact which
can be expected to mitigate the positive competition e¤ect associated with complete
dismantling. In Table 4 we have 1 = 0:5 along with ~2 = 0:5 in scenario S1 and
~2 = 0:75 in scenario S2. Now the cost e¤ect is again dominating and data sharing
is best policy. In all scenarios presented in these two tables, vertical separation is the
worst policy option and it even reduces social and consumer surplus compared to the
reference scenario. Compared to the scenarios presented in Table 1, vertical separation
thus performes worse here. This is in line with intuition: as product di¤erentiation
13
Scenario R S1 S2 V S CD
p1A=M 4:87 4:88 4:87 6:52 5:79
p2A=M 5:86 5:82 5:84 6:52 5:79
p1B 6:92 6:92 6:92 5:93 5:79
p2B 5:54 5:55 5:55 5:93 5:79
p1M     5:79
p2M     5:79
t1A    3:65 3:68
t2A=M 4:00 3:94 3:97 3:65 3:68
t1B 5:04 5:04 5:04 3:61 3:68
t2B 3:66 3:68 3:67 3:61 3:68
t1M     3:68
t2M     3:68
1 2:47 2:48 2:47 1:09 1:17
2 1:09 1:11 1:10 1:09 1:17
A    1:36 0:61
B 0:38 0:37 0:38 0:82 0:61
M     0:61
d1A=M 0:45 0:45 0:45 0:23 0:14
d2A=M 0:23 0:24 0:23 0:23 0:14
d1B 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:17 0:14
d2B 0:14 0:14 0:14 0:17 0:14
d1M     0:14
d2M     0:14
CS 11:82 11:83 11:83 11:25 12:09
TS 15:78 15:80 15:79 15:63 16:28
Table 3: Lower competition intensity and small cost advantage: 1 = 0:9 with ~2 = 0:9
in scenario S1 and ~2 = 0:95 in scenario S2.
becomes more signicant, the benets of increased competition are small and do not
outweigh negative impact of double marginalization together with the loss of the data
related cost advantage.
4.2.2 Large scale factor and more attractive outside option
We now consider an even larger level of  = 2:5 together with a smaller level of the price
of the outside option p00 = 4 = 42. Table 5 presents the results for the case where the
cost advantage is small, while Table 6 is obtained for the larger cost advantage.
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Scenario R S1 S2 V S CD
p1A=M 5:04 5:10 5:07 6:52 5:79
p2A=M 7:20 6:86 7:02 6:52 5:79
p1B 7:23 7:28 7:25 5:93 5:79
p2B 5:40 5:43 5:42 5:93 5:79
p1M     5:79
p2M     5:79
t1A    3:65 3:68
t2A 2:66 2:25 2:45 3:65 3:68
t1B 5:22 5:29 5:25 3:61 3:68
t2B 3:40 3:44 3:42 3:61 3:68
t1M     3:68
t2M     3:68
1A=M 3:04 3:10 3:07 1:09 1:17
2 0:66 0:72 0:69 1:09 1:17
A    1:36 0:61
B 0:50 0:49 0:49 0:82 0:61
M     0:61
d1A=M 0:49 0:47 0:48 0:23 0:14
d2A=M 0:11 0:14 0:13 0:23 0:14
d1B 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:17 0:14
d2B 0:19 0:19 0:19 0:17 0:14
d1M     0:14
d2M     0:14
CS 12:68 12:68 12:68 11:25 12:09
TS 16:89 17:00 16:94 15:63 16:28
Table 4: Lower competition intensity and large cost advantage: 1 = 0:5 with ~2 = 0:5
in scenario S1 and ~2 = 0:75 in scenario S2.
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Scenario R S V S CD
p1A=M 5:97 5:98 8:38 7:72
p2A=M 9:06 8:98 8:38 7:72
p1B 8:93 8:94 7:73 7:72
p2B 7:33 7:33 7:73 7:72
p1M    7:72
p2M    7:72
t1   4:69 4:62
t2A=M 3:98 3:90 4:69 4:62
t1B 5:97 5:98 4:57 4:62
t2B 4:37 4:37 4:57 4:62
t1M    4:62
t2M    4:62
1A=M 2:57 2:58 0:97 1:04
2 0:65 0:66 0:97 1:04
A   1:19 0:59
B 0:46 0:46 0:66 0:59
M    0:59
d1A=M 0:35 0:35 0:16 0:09
d2A=M 0:10 0:10 0:16 0:09
d1B 0:05 0:05 0:10 0:09
d2B 0:10 0:10 0:10 0:09
d1M    0:09
d2M    0:09
CS 12:92 12:92 12:46 13:14
TS 16:62 16:63 16:26 17:00
Table 5: Low competition intensity, small cost advantage and lower price of the outside
option:  = 2:5, p00 = 4, 1 = 0:9 with ~2 = 0:9 in scenario S1 and ~2 = 0:95 in scenario
S2.
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Scenario R S V S CD
p1A=M 6:47 6:52 9:65 8:90
p2A=M 10:50 10:12 9:65 8:90
p1B 10:36 10:39 8:92 8:90
p2B 8:43 8:46 8:92 8:90
p1M    8:90
p2M    8:90
t1A   5:33 5:25
t2A=M 4:52 4:10 5:33 5:25
t1B 6:86 6:91 5:19 5:25
t2B 4:93 4:97 5:19 5:25
t1M    5:25
t2M    5:25
1A=M 2:97 3:02 1:06 1:14
2 0:69 0:74 1:06 1:14
A   1:31 0:65
B 0:49 0:48 0:72 0:65
M    0:65
d1A=M 0:35 0:34 0:15 0:08
d2A=M 0:09 0:10 0:15 0:08
d1B 0:04 0:04 0:09 0:08
d2B 0:09 0:09 0:09 0:08
d1M    0:08
d2M    0:08
CS 14:13 14:14 12:57 13:32
TS 18:30 18:39 16:75 17:58
Table 6: Low competition intensity, large cost advantage and lower price of the outside
option:  = 2:5, p00 = 4, 1 = 0:5 with ~2 = 0:5 in scenario S1 and ~2 = 0:75 in scenario
S2.
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Not surprisingly, the large degree of product di¤erentiation and the increased at-
tractiveness of the outside option concur to bring about a signicant drop in market
coverage. Interestingly, this does not a¤ect our main conclusions: complete dismantling
is the best option with a small cost advantage while data sharing dominates when the
cost advantage is more signicant.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study several ways to regulate a vertically integrated marketplace in
the parcel delivery sector, that benets from a cost advantage in delivery due to data
collected on consumershabits and preferences through the retail activity. In particular,
we compare three regulatory schemes: (i) imposing the integrated marketplace to share
its information with the other delivery operator which in turn will lower this opera-
tors cost of delivering the marketplaces product; (ii) imposing a vertical separation
under which the delivery operator previously owned and managed by the marketplace
becomes independent and no longer benets from a cost advantage over its competi-
tor; (iii) imposing a full dismantlement of the marketplace under which there is both
vertical and horizontal separation (all retailers and delivery opertors, now independent,
compete on their market segment). The main robust conclusion we obtain is that the
optimal policy is either complete dismantlement or data sharing. The relative impacts
on consumer surplus and total welfare of these two options involve a tradeo¤ between
the increased competition implied by complete dismantling and the data related deliv-
ery cost advantage achieved under data sharing. When this cost advantage is small,
completely dismantling dominates, while data sharing is the best policy when the cost
advantage is large. Vertical separation is never optimal.
Our results are obtained in a simple and stylized model and have to be qualied ac-
cordingly. In particular we concentrate on delivery costs while in reality superior data
also enhances the possibilities to practice sophisticated pricing schemes. One can expect
that this makes data sharing an even more powerful regulatory tools. We have also ne-
glected the possible qualityadvantage associated with marketplaces. As intermediary
platform the marketplace provides tools to the di¤erent parties (producers/retailers and
18
consumers/buyers) which simplify trading: online payment system, inventory manage-
ment, authenticated information about the seller and/or the buyer, various warranties
and more and more often integrated delivery services. Taking this e¤ect into account
when comparing data sharing and total dismantlement is likely to increase the number
of cases in which data sharing is the best policy.
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Expected consumer surplus is given by















see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1979), p.114.
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